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Spillover from the Exxon Valdez: North Carolina's
New Offshore Oil Spill Statute
Shortly after midnight on March 24, 1989, the tanker Exxon Valdez ran
aground in the biologically rich waters of Prince William Sound, beginning the
largest oil spill in United States history.' Drifting with the wind and currents,
eleven million gallons of spilled oil eventually stretched along more than 1200
miles of shoreline.2 The enormous spill devastated the local fishing industry and
threatened several national and state parks and wildlife refuges.3 Although the
full environmental and economic effects of the spill are yet unknown, "[c]leanup
costs alone are estimated at approximately $2 billion."'4
Within a month, the incident had spawned over thirty lawsuits,5 prompting
commentators to speculate whether full compensation was even possible. 6 The
cleanup response quickly drew criticism from officials in both Congress and the
Bush Administration who complained that "the oil spill contingency plan and
the availability of adequate equipment were dramatically lacking."'7 As the
cleanup effort lingered for months after the spill, the failure of existing oil spill
legislation became increasingly apparent. Outrage over the Alaskan spill re-
newed a fourteen-year-old debate over comprehensive federal oil spill legislation
in both houses of Congress.8
The Exxon Valdez disaster also fueled a continuing debate over exploratory
1. Over several days, the Exxon Valdez spilled approximately 11 million gallons (240,000 bar-
rels) of crude oil. Straube, Is Full Compensation Possible for the Damages Resulting from the Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill?, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10338, 10338 (1989):" The largest previous tanker spill in
United States waters occurred in 1976 when the Argo Merchant ran aground oft Massachusetts,
spilling 7.7 million gallons (180,000 barrels). U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DRILLING AND PRouc-
TION DISCHARGES AND OIL SPILLS IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 15-16 (1989).
2. "Had the spill occurred on the eastern seaboard, it would have stretched from Cape Cod to
North Carolina's Outer Banks." Hodgson, Alaska's Big Spill: Can the Wilderness Heal?, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC, Jan. 1990, at 12.
3. Straube, supra note 1, at 10338. "The spill ocurred in a remote and pristine area, abundant
with wildlife and fisheries, at the beginning of the fish spawning, seal pupping, and bird migration
seasons." Id.
4. Kuntz, Oil Spill Negotiators Find Another Sticking Point, 48 CONG. Q. 1261, 1262 (weekly
ed. Apr. 28, 1990) (quoting Sen. George Mitchell, D-Me.). For a detailed examination of the Exxon
Valdez spill, see Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Hearing on Topics Concerning the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
into the Prince William Sound of Alaska Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard & Navigation of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
5. Straube, supra note 1, at 10338 (citing Exxon Says 31 Lawsuits Filed in Oil Spill, Washing-
ton Post, Apr. 26, 1989, at A-12, col. 4).
6. See id. at 10349 (concluding that the availability of full compensation is "unclear").
7. 135 CONG. REc. S3221 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1989) (Sen. Murkowski paraphrasing remarks of
Secretary of Transportation Samuel Skinner).
8. See generally Jones, Oil Spill Compensation and Liability Legislation: When Good Things
Don't Happen to Good Bills, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10333, 10333 (1989) (Rep. Walter Jones' account of
"the perverse legislative hell that has dogged consideration of oil spill compensation bills in the
United States Congress"). Only days before the Exxon Valdez spill, Representative Jones (D-N.C.)
introduced a comprehensive oil spill bill in the House. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135
CONG. REC. H708 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1989). Senator George Mitchell (D-Me.) introduced a similar
bill in the Senate less than 2 weeks after the spill. See S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC.
S3241 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1989). For a discussion of the House and Senate bills, see infra notes 53-79
and accompanying text.
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drilling off the North Carolina coast.9 Even before the Alaskan spill, opponents
of offshore drilling, including both environmentalists and commercial interests,
worried that a spill off the North Carolina coast would "foul the state's beaches
and blacken the reputation of its tourism and fishing industries."' 10 News of the
Exxon Valdez only raised concerns over North Carolina's oil spill response
capacity. 11
Against this backdrop, the North Carolina General Assembly recognized
the inadequacy of North Carolina's oil pollution legislation. Seeking to mitigate
the potentially catastrophic effects of offshore oil and gas activities on North
Carolina coastal resources, the General Assembly enacted comprehensive legis-
lation dealing specifically with oil spill liability and cleanup. 12 Among other
things, the new legislation subjects responsible parties to strict liability for all
cleanup costs and direct or indirect damages resulting from oil spills affecting
North Carolina waters. 13 Unlike existing and proposed federal legislation, the
new North Carolina law places no limit on liability for responsible parties who
do not fall within a specified exception. 14 The new law also assigns cleanup
responsibility to the Department of Natural Resources and Community Devel-
opment,15 and requires the State Emergency Response Commission to promul-
gate an oil spill contingency plan. 16
This Note analyzes North Carolina's new oil spill legislation and its rela-
tionship to similar federal and state laws. Sections I and II examine federal oil
pollution legislation and its preemptive effect on state oil spill laws. Section III
examines oil spill statutes in other states, and Section IV analyzes the new North
Carolina oil spill legislation. Section V then compares the North Carolina law
to similar federal and state statutory schemes, and suggests additional measures
that may strengthen North Carolina's effort to combat coastal oil pollution. The
Note concludes that the new North Carolina legislation's emphasis on post-spill
cleanup and compensation will help deal with the effects of oil spills, but argues
that more is needed to protect North Carolina's coast.
9. Heading a group of eight oil companies, Mobil Oil Corporation plans to drill exploratory
wells about 50 miles off Cape Hatteras. Tursi, Debate Rages Over Proposed Well, Winston-Salem
(N.C.) Journal, Feb. 26, 1989, at Al, ol. 1.
10. Id.
11. See State Unprepared to Cope with Oil Spill, Official Says, Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald,
May 1, 1989, at 1-C, col. I [hereinafter State Unprepared].
12. See Act of July 19, 1989, ch. 656, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 222 [hereinafter the "Offshore Oil
Spill Act"]. Section 5 of the Act added a new Part to Article 21A of Chapter 143 of the General
Statutes entitled "Offshore Oil and Gas Activities: Adverse Environmental Impact Protection." Id.
§ 5, 1989 N.C. Session Laws at 226. This Part originally was enacted as Part 2B of Chapter 143 by
Act of July 19, 1989, ch. 656, § 5, 1989 N.C. Session Laws 222, 226 (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-
215.94N to -215.94W); but was recodifled as Part 2C by Act of Aug. 12, 1989, ch. 770, § 75.5, 1989
N.C. Session Laws 962, 975 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.94AA to -215.94JJ (Supp.
1989)).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.94CC(a) (Supp. 1989).
14. See id. § 143-215.94CC(b)(l)-(7).
15. Id. § 143-215.94EE(a).
16. Id. § 143-215.94HH(a).
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I. FEDERAL OIL POLLUTION LEGISLATION
A. Existing Federal Legislation
The most important federal statute dealing specifically with oil spill liability
and cleanup is Section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA).17 Announcing the policy behind the FWPCA, Section 311 broadly
declares "that there should be no discharges of oil.., into or upon the navigable
waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of
the contiguous zone." Is When an oil spill occurs, however, the FWPCA autho-
rizes the federal government to remove the oil unless the President "determines
such removal will be done properly by the owner or operator of the vessel, on-
shore facility, or offshore facility from which the discharge occurs."' 19 The
FWPCA establishes a special fund (the "311 Fund"), maintained primarily
through congressional appropriations, to finance federal cleanup operations.20
The FWPCA also requires promulgation of a National Contingency Plan to
"provide for efficient, coordinated, and effective action to minimize damage from
oil ... discharges, including containment, dispersal, and removal."2 1
Although the government initially draws from the 311 Fund to subsidize its
cleanup efforts,22 the FWPCA makes owners and operators liable to the govern-
ment for removal costs, including restoration or replacement of natural re-
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) [hereinafter "FWPCA"]. Section 311 originally
was enacted as part of the Water Quality and Improvement Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 11,
84 Stat. 91 (1970) (hereinafter "WQIA"). Section I1 of the WQIA was modified slightly and trans-
ferred to § 311 of the FWCPA. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 311, 86 Stat. 862 (1972) (codified as amended
at 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). For a detailed analysis of the FWPCA oil spill provi-
sion, see Note, Strict Liability Under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act: Cleaning Up Respondeat
Superior and Negligence, 10 CoLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 149 (1985), and Note, Oil Spills and Cleanup
Bils Federal Recovery of Oil Spill Cleanup Costs, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1761 (1980).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (1982). Section 31 l(a) broadly defines the term "discharge." See id.
§ 1321(a)(2).
19. Id. § 1321(c)(1). Section 31 1(a)(6) defines the term "owner or operator" as:
(A) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such
vessel, and (B) in the case of an onshore facility, and an offshore facility, any person own-
ing or operating such onshore facility or offshore facility, and (C) in the case of any aban-
doned offshore facility, the person who owned or operated such facility immediately prior
to such abandonment.
Id. § 1321(a)(6). Section 311(a) also defines "vessel," "onshore facility," and "offshore facility." Id.
§ 1321(a)(3), (10), (11).
Interestingly, as of August, 1989, President Bush had not federalized cleanup activities in
Prince William Sound despite Vice President Quayle's criticism of Exxon's response as inadequate.
See Straube, supra note 1, at 10341 n.35.
20. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(k)(1) (1982). The 311 Fund may contain up to $35,000,000. Id.
Although the fund includes costs and fines recovered from responsible parties, "[s]ince the 31 l(k)
fund was created, the Coast Guard has spent almost $184 million cleaning up oil spills but has been
able to recover only $144 million." H.R. REP. No. 242, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 34 (1989)
(Report to accompany H.R. 1465). "This [311] fund has never reached its authorized size... and as
of June 1989 had a balance of $7.3 million." Jones, supra note 8, at 10333-34.
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(2) (1982). The National Oil & Hazardous Substances Pollution Con-
tingency Plan is codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1989). Section 3110)(1) of the FWPCA requires pro-
mulgation of similar regulations. 33 U.S.C. § 13210)(1) (1982); see, e.g., Criteria for State, Local
and Regional Oil Removal Contingency Plans, 40 C.F.R. § 109 (1989); Oil Pollution Prevention, 40
C.F.R. § 112 (1989).
22. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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sources, 23 up to certain limits depending on the type of vessel or facility
responsible for the discharge.24 If, however, the government proves that the
"discharge was the result of willful negligence or willful misconduct within the
privity and knowledge of the owner," the liability limits do not apply.25 Owners
and operators can avoid liability only by proving that the spill was caused solely
by an act of God, an act of war, negligence of the federal government, an act or
omission of a third party, or any combination of the above.2 6 The FWPCA
creates no private remedies, but "Congress explicitly refused to prohibit state
liability schemes" 27 when it enacted the FWPCA.
Although the FWPCA remains the primary federal oil pollution statute,
"the location of an oil spill or the origin of the spilled oil"28 may trigger applica-
tion of other federal statutes. Special oil spill provisions govern oil produced
from offshore oil leases,29 oil handled at deepwater ports,30 oil transported
through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System,3 1 and oil spills affecting national
marine sanctuaries.3 2 The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of
1978 (OCSLA), 33 for example, provide a statutory scheme governing spills re-
sulting from oil and gas activities on the Outer Continental Shelf.3 4 Like the
FWPCA, OCSLA establishes a special fund to help finance federal cleanup ef-
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4) (1982).
24. Owners and operators of "inland oil barges" are responsible for "$125 per gross ton of such
barge, or $125,000, whichever is greater, and in the case of any other vessel, $150 per gross ton of
such vessel (or, for a vessel carrying oil or hazardous substances as cargo, $250,000), whichever is
greater." Id. § 1321(f)(1). In contrast, owners and operators of onshore and offshore facilities are
liable up to $50,000,000. Id. § 1321(f)(2), (3). Liability limits for small onshore facilities are
promulgated pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(2) (1982), and codified at 40 C.F.R. § 113 (1989).
Owners of certain vessels must also maintain evidence of financial responsibility in amounts
equal to the corresponding liability limits. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(p) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(l)-(3). The Fourth Circuit has construed the term "willful negligence"
in § 311(f) to mean "reckless disregard for the probable consequences of a voluntary act or omis-
sion." Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 614 (4th Cir. 1979).
26. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(l)-(3) (1982). Owners and operators may recover their own
cleanup costs when discharges result solely from causes other than their own acts. See id. § 1321(g),
(i).
27. Lipeles, State Control of Oil Pollution: Legislating in the Twilight Zone, 1 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REv. 431, 437 (1976) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)(2)). Cf. infra notes 87-93 and accompanying
text (discussing whether FWPCA liability limits apply to state liability schemes).
28. Straube, supra note I, at 10339.
29. See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1824
(1982 & Supp. V 1987) [hereinafter "OCSLA"]. For a discussion of the OCSLA oil spill provisions,
see infra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
30. See Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) [hereinaf-
ter "DWPA"]. "A deepwater port is basically a set of elaborate buoys at which supertankers can
dock and transfer their cargo to pipelines running underwater to shore." Lipeles, supra note 27, at
431 n.3; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1501(10) (1982) (defining deepwater ports for purposes of the DWPA).
There is currently only one deepwater oil port in the Unites States, the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port.
See Jones, supra note 8, at 10334.
31. See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1982) [hereinafter
"TAPAA"]. For an application of TAPAA and FWPCA to the facts of the Exxon Valdez spill, see
Straube, supra note 1, at 10339-50.
32. See Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434
(1982).
33. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1824 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
34. See id. § 1802(8).
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forts.35 The OCSLA Fund, however, differs from the 311 Fund in several signif-
icant respects. The OCSLA Fund not only pays federal and state removal
costs, 36 but also reimburses public and private claimants for damages including
loss of real and personal property, natural resources, profits, and tax revenues. 37
Moreover, in contrast to the 311 Fund's reliance on appropriated funds,38 the
OCSLA fund is maintained by a surcharge on oil obtained from federal offshore
leases.3 9 Additionally, OCSLA imposes strict liability on owners and operators
for both public and private damages4° within prescribed limits. 4 1 Notwithstand-
ing the limitation on damages, however, OCSLA imposes unlimited liability for
both federal and state cleanup costs.42
Another federal statute that may affect oil spill compensation is the Limita-
tion of Liability Act of 1851 (LLA).43 Although not specifically geared to oil
spills, the LLA limits a shipowner's liability to the value of the vessel if a mari-
time accident occurs without the shipowner's "privity or knowledge." 44 Be-
cause this valuation is made after the accident, 45 the LLA may restrict
significantly recovery of oil spill damages from vessel owners. Following the
Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967,46 for example, the shipowner filed a petition
35. See id. § 1812 [hereinafter "OCSLA Fund"]. Similar funds are authorized by the DWPA
and TAPPA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1517(f) (1982) ("Deepwater Port Liability Fund"); 43 U.S.C.
§ 1651(c)(4) (1982) ("Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund").
36. See 43 U.S.C. § 1811(22) (1982) (defining "removal costs").
37. See generally id. § 1813 (defining permissible claims and persons entitled to assert claims).
38. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
39. See 43 U.S.C. § 1812(d) (1982). The surcharge, which may not exceed three cents per bar-
rel, is "designed to insure that the Fund is maintained at a level of not less than $100,000,000 and
not more than $200,000,000." Id. § 1812(d)(2). According to a 1988 report by the Congressional
Research Service, "the fund balance currently exceeds $120 million, with [fiscal year 1989] collec-
tions projected at $10 million." CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, OIL POLLUTION LIABILITY
AND COMPENSATION 5 (1988) [hereinafter OIL POLLUTION LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION]. Cf.
supra note 20 (noting 311 Fund's June, 1989 balance of $7.3 million).
40. See 43 U.S.C. § 1814(a) (1982) (strict, joint and several liability); id. § 1813(a) (describing
potential damages). Owners and operators can escape liability under OCSLA by proving one of
several statutory defenses similar to those in the FWPCA. See id. § 1814(c) ("exceptions and de-
fenses"); cf. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1982) (describing statutory defenses under the FWPCA).
41. Vessel owners and operators are liable for damages up to $250,000 or $300 per gross ton,
whichever is greater. 43 U.S.C. § 1814(b)(1) (1982). For offshore facilities, recoverable damages are
limited to $35,000,000. Id. § 1814(b)(2). Like the FWPCA, however, OCSLA imposes full liability
on owners and operators in the case of willful misconduct, gross negligenge or failure to obey appli.
cable federal regulations. Id. § 1814(b). Cf. supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (defining
scope of liability under FWPCA).
42. See 43 U.S.C. § 1814(d) (1982).
43. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-196 (Supp. V 1987).
44. See id. § 183(a). "Privity" refers to "some fault or neglect in which the shipowner person-
ally participates." In re Texaco, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 1272, 1278 (E.D. La. 1983). "Knowledge means
personal cognizance or means of knowledge, of which the shipowner is bound to avail himself, of a
contemplated loss or condition likely to cause loss, unless proper means are adopted to prevent it."
Id.; see also Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1978) (shipowner's
negligence determined on basis of customary industry practice or violation of statutory duty), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1978).
45. See Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 120-22 (1871).
46. The Torrey Canyon ran aground in the English Channel, spilling its entire cargo of crude
oil, and eventually sank after being bombed by the Royal Air Force. See Note, Liability for Mari-
time Oil Pollution: A Comparison of the Maine Coastal Conveyance Act with Federal Liability Provi-
sions, 29 ME. L. REv. 47, 50 (1977). The twenty-nine million gallon spill "cost an estimated $15
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under the LLA in federal court to limit its liability to $50, the value of a single
remaining lifeboat.47 Although the LLA" 'can be stretched out or narrowed at
will' depending on the facts of the particular case and the philosophy of the
judge hearing the case,"'48 the statute has survived despite ample opportunity for
congressional amendment or repeal. 49
B. Proposed Federal Legislation
Recognizing the complexity of the current federal oil spill scheme, each
Congress since 1975 has considered a bill of some form designed to overhaul and
consolidate domestic oil pollution legislation.50 Despite optimism over such leg-
islation in the past, a House-Senate rift over preemption of stricter state laws
ultimately doomed previous oil spill bills.51 In November 1989, however, the
House reversed its traditional stance in favor of preemption, clearing "the way
for near-certain congressional approval of such legislation for the first time since
Congress began wrestling with the issue in 1975."52
Fueled by outrage over the Exxon Valdez spill, 53 both chambers of the
101st Congress recently passed similar comprehensive oil spill bills.54 Although
both bills would leave states free to establish their own liability and cleanup
systems, 55 the bills would create a uniform federal liability system for oil spill
million to clean up and spawned damage claims of $25 million that were ultimately settled for ap-
proximately $7 million." Jones, supra note 8, at 10333.
47. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969).
48. Mendelsohn & Fidell, Liability for Oil Pollution-United States Law, 10 J. MAR. L. & COM.
475, 477 (1979) (quoting G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 877 (2d ed. 1975)).
Cf. In re Hokkaido Fisheries Inc., 506 F. Supp. 631, 633-34 (D. Alaska 1981) (construing language
in FWPCA, "notwithstanding any other provision of law," 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1), to infer congres-
sional intent that the LLA not apply to recovery of cleanup costs under the FWPCA).
49. But see infra text accompanying note 60 (noting bills currently before Congress that would
prohibit application of LLA to removal costs and damages resulting from oil spills).
50. For a history of Congressional consideration of comprehensive oil spill liability and com-
pensation bills since 1975, see Jones, supra note 8, at 10333-37; and OIL POLLUTION LIABILITY AND
COMPENSATION, supra note 39, at 9-14.
51. See Jones, supra note 8, at 10333. "Generally, the House has been in favor of preempting
State laws, while the Senate has not. Industry favors preempting State programs, while States desire
to retain their liability standards and separate compensatory funds." OIL POLLUTION LIABILITY
AND COMPENSATION, supra note 39, at 15. For a discussion of the preemptive effect of current
federal oil pollution law, see infra notes 80-112 and accompanying text.
52. Hager, Tough Oil-Spill Measure Rides Atop Environmental Wave, 47 CONG. Q. 3043, 3043
(weekly ed. Nov. 11, 1989). The original House bill, introduced by Representative Walter Jones (D-
N.C.), would have preempted state oil spill liability regimes. See H.R. REP. No. 242, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess., § 109(a) (1989). On February 8, 1989, however, the House passed, by a 279-143 vote, an
amendment introduced by Representative George Miller (D-Calif.) which prevented preemption of
state laws relating to oil spill liability, compensation, and cleanup. See 135 CONG. REc. D1321
(daily ed. Nov. 8, 1989).
53. "The event is driving [the] concerns of members of Congress." Hager, supra note 52, at
3043 (quoting Rep. George Miller, D-Calif.).
54. The Senate passed its version of the bill, S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), with a 99-0
vote on August 4, 1989. See 135 CONG. REc. D934-35 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989). The full House bill,
H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), passed by a 375-5 vote on November 9, 1989. See 135
CONG. REc. D1333 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1989). See also Hager, supra note 52, at 3044 (comparing the
House and Senate bills).
55. For example the House bill provides that nothing in the new Act or the LLA "shall be
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cleanup and compensation5 6 in a single statute entitled the "Oil Pollution Act of
1989." 57 Both versions of the new Act would raise sharply the federal oil spill
liability limits,58 and subject responsible parties to private and public claims for
cleanup costs, economic losses, and natural resource damage.5 9 The bills also
would explicitly preclude application of the LLA to cleanup costs or damages
resulting from oil spills.6°
Under both the House and Senate versions, the new Act would create a one
billion dollar Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, 61 financed by a per-barrel tax on
domestic and imported oil.62 The new Fund would provide direct compensation
to public and private spill victims provided that the responsible party reached its
liability limit or refused to settle a claim for damages within a specified number
of days.63 In any event, the fund would pay the immediate cleanup costs of both
federal and state governments."
Both versions of the new Act would increase federal control over oil spill
cleanup and prevention. Either bill, for example, would empower the President
to direct both federal and private industry cleanup efforts.65 The bills also
construed or interpreted as preempting any State . . . from imposing any additional liability or
requirements with respect to the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State." H.R.
1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 1018(a)(1)(A) (1989). The Senate bill contains substantially similar
language. See S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 106(e) (1989).
56. Both bills would amend or repeal the oil spill provisions in the FWPCA, TAPAA, DWPA,
and OCSLA. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, §§ 2001-2005 (1989) ("Conforming
Amendments"); S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., tit. III, §§ 301-05 (1989) (same).
57. See, ag., H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § l(a) (1989).
58. The House and Senate currently disagree on the exact limits on liability or the parties
responsible for payment. Kuntz, supra note 4, at 1262. The House would split liability between ship
and cargo owners for the greater of $1200 per gross ton of oil or $10,000,000 for large tankers; less
for smaller vessels. Id. In contrast, the Senate would impose liability on shipowners only; and
would limit liability to $1000 per ton, up to $10 million, regardless of size. Id. Like the FWPCA
and OCSLA, however, both would impose unlimited liability in the event of gross negligence, willful
misconduct, or violation of federal regulation. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., Sess. 1004(c); S. 686,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 102(c)(2) (1989). Cf. supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (discussing
scope of liability under FWPCA); supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (discussing current
liability limits under OCSLA).
59. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 1002 (1989); S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 102(a)
(1989). As under the FWPCA and OCSLA, liability under the new Act could be avoided com-
pletely by proving one or a combination of the traditional defenses. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., § 1003 (1989); S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(b) (1989).
60. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 1018(c) (1989); S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 106(e) (1989).
61. Although the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund originally was established by the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-509, tit. VIII, § 8033(a), 100 Stat. 1959 (1986), it has
been awaiting implementing legislation ever since. See Jones, supra note 8, at 10336-37.
62. "The size and structure of the tax are under the jurisdiction of the House Ways and Means
Committee, and details are part of negotiations over a deficit-reduction 'reconcilation' bill now in
conference." Hager, supra note 52, at 3044. The new Act also would transfer the 311, OCSLA,
DWPA, and TAPAA funds into the new fund. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., tit. II,§§ 2001-2005 (1989) ("Conforming Amendments"); S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., tit. III, §§ 301-05
(1989) (same).
63. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 1013(c)(2) (1989) (90 days); S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., § 103(c)(4)(D) (1989) (180 days).
64. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., § 1012(a) (1989); S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sass.,
§ 103(a) (1989).
65. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 4201(a) (1989); S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 201
(1989).
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would establish regional oil spill strike force teams, 66 and require increased oil
spill contingency planning.67 Both bills would create research programs to
study the environmental effects and cleanup methods involved in oil spills. 68
Additionally, in the hope of preventing future spills, the House bill would estab-
lish a series of mariner licensing requirements, vessel manning requirements,
vessel operating procedures, and other safety measures. 69
Although the House bill explicitly disclaims any intent to preempt state
laws,70 the preemption issue has resurfaced with a dispute over United States'
participation in an international oil spill agreement. Provisions in the House bill
would implement, subject to Senate ratification, a forty-three nation agreement
which sets liability limits for tanker spills and establishes an international oil
spill liability fund.7 1 Fearing that the liability limits would effectively preempt
stiffer state liability laws, Senate conferees remain adamantly opposed to the
international accord.7 2
Besides the protocol-preemption debate, few major differences remain in the
House and Senate bills.73 The most significant controversy concerns a provision
in the House bill 74 that would require double hulls on tankers. 75 In August
1989, the Senate voted 51-48 to reject the double-hull mandate, choosing instead
to allow the Secretary of Transportation "to require double hulls only if a study
found they provided significant benefits."'76 Although a compromise over
double' hulls appears promising, 77 resolution of the protocol-implementation is-
66. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 4203 (1989); S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 203
(1989).
67. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 4202 (1989); S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 204
(1989).
68. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., § 7001 (1989); S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 205
(1989).
69. See generally H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., tit. IV, subtit. A, §§ 4101-4119 (1989)
("Prevention"). The Senate bill would require a study to consider oil spill prevention measures. See
S. 686, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., § 207(a) (1989).
70. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
71. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3001-3009 (1989). The agreement actually encom-
passes two international accords, signed in 1969 and 1971, and amendments drafted in 1984 in the
form of protocols. Kuntz, supra note 4, at 1261. For an analysis of these international accords, see
Note, Oil Spill Liability and Compensation: Time to Clean Up the Law, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 787.
72. Kuntz, supra note 4, at 1261. Additionally, many Senators oppose the House-approved
implementing provisions on constitutional grounds, claiming invasion of the Senate's constitutional
power over treaties. Id.
73. See generally Hager, supra note 52, at 3044 (discussing the House-Senate differences).
74. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 4118 (1989).
75. Hager, supra note 52, at 3044. In addition to the double-hull dispute, the House and Senate
currently disagree on whether to impose liability on cargo owners, as well as shipowners. See supra
note 58. Concerned about its effect on small independent companies, the Senate has refused to
accept cargo-owner liability. Kuntz, supra note 4, at 1262. However, a "possible compromise would
make cargo owners liable only if the spill involved crude oil, thereby exempting independents who
deal in gasoline and heating oil." Id.
76. Hager, supra note 52, at 3044. See S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 207(a) (1989) (requiring
study to consider, inter alia, "modifications in tanker construction and operation standards").
77. As of April 28, 1990, the "[1]astest Senate offer would phase out existing vessels over 15 to
20 years, with the largest and oldest removed first. It calls for double hulls, but allows for an alter-
native if the National Academy of Sciences certifies a safer way." Kuntz, supra note 4, at 1262. A
report of June 2, 1990 noted that House negotiators also had made concessions, "offering more
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sue remains a significant obstacle to final passage of the Oil Pollution Act of
1989.78 Until a compromise can be reached, federal oil pollution law will consist
of a confusing "patchwork of liability limits, legal defenses, and compensation
fund programs. 7
9
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE OIL SPILL LAWS
The United States Constitution expressly grants to the federal courts exclu-
sive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime claims.80 Although "state law
must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law.., this limitation still
leaves the States a wide scope." 8 1 In Askew v. American Waterways Operators,
Inc.,82 the United States Supreme Court included state oil spill liability laws
within this "wide scope" when it upheld the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and
Control Act. 83
Seeking to avoid a proliferation of similar state laws, the shipping industry
and other affected interests claimed the Florida Act invaded a regulatory area
preempted by the predecessor to the FWVPCA.84 Finding no collision between
the federal and state laws, however, the Court stressed that "[w]hile the Federal
Act is concerned only with actual cleanup costs by the Federal Government, the
State of Florida is concerned with its own cleanup costs."85 Accordingly, the
Court concluded that "since Congress dealt only with 'cleanup' costs, it left the
States free to impose 'liability' in damages for losses suffered both by the States
and by private interests."'8 6 Because the Florida Act did not "in terms provide
lenient schedules that would allow tankers with single hulls to operate well into the next century."
Cushman, With Oil Tanker Ablaze in Gulf, Oil Cleanup Plans Languish, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1990,
at Al, col. 1 (citing source from the National Resources Defense Council).
78. According to a report on the implementing provisions debate, the "Senate appears unified
in opposition, and some House members are against the provisions, too. But many House members,
backed by the Bush administration, support it." Kuntz, supra note 4, at 1262. See also Cushman,
supra note 77, at A12, col. I ("On the biggest sticking point, the international agreement [on] oil
liability, there is no sign of compromise.")
Although the Oil Pollution Act of 1989 had not been enacted at the time this Note went to
print, House and Senate negotiators were scheduled to grapple over the remaining issues during the
summer of 1990. See id
79. Mendelsohn & Fidell, supra note 48, at 498. For a discussion of the current federal scheme,
see supra notes 17-49, and accompanying text.
80. In relevant part, the Admiralty Clause states: "The judicial power shall extend to... all
Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
81. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S 354, 373 (1959).
82. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
83. Id. at 332. The legislation at issue is codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.011 to 376.21
(West 1987) [hereinafter "Florida Act"]. At the time of the Askew decision, the Florida legislation
imposed strict liability without limit on vessels and terminal facilities for oil spill cleanup costs and
both public and private damages. Askew, 411 U.S. at 327. The Florida statute has since been
amended to limit liability absent gross negligence or willful misconduct. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 376.12(1) (West 1987); see also Barrett & Warren, History of Florida Oil Spill Legislation, 5 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 309, 327-37 (1977) (discussing industry pressure and other reasons for liability limita-
tion amendments).
84. At issue was the preemptive effect of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-224, § 11, 84 Stat. 91 (1970). Askew, 411 U.S. at 328. For a discussion of the transfer of the
WQIA to the FWPCA, see supra note 17.
85. Askew, 411 U.S. at 335-36.
86. Id. at 336. Although Askew determined the preemptive effect of the FWPCA, as yet no
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for unlimited liability,"' 87 however, the Court expressly reserved the question
whether the federal liability limitations apply to state liability statutes.88
Although the Supreme Court has never answered this question, the Fourth
Circuit, in Steuart Transportation Co. v. Allied Towing Corp.,89 held that the
FWPCA's liability ceilings could not prevent the state of Virginia from recover-
ing oil spill cleanup costs exceeding FWPCA limits9 ° under a state statute af-
fording no limitation on liability.9 1 To buttress its conclusion, the Fourth
Circuit stressed that "Congress expressly disclaimed any intention to preempt
the states 'from imposing any requirement or liability with respect to the dis-
charge of oil.' "92 Because the negligent shipowner was denied relief under the
LLA, however, the Steuart court never decided whether the LLA applies to
state strict liability statutes.
9 3
Although few cases have addressed the issue, at least two federal district
courts have applied the LLA to claims against shipowners brought under state
oil spill liability statutes.94 Neither case, however, considered the potential ef-
fect of the ambiguous language in Section 311 (f)(1) of the FWPCA, which es-
tablishes liability limits on shipowners "notwithstanding any other provision of
law."95 Because the FWPCA is the exclusive federal remedy in the oil pollution
context, some commentators have suggested that the language in Section
31 l(f)(1) "supercedes the Limitation of Liability Act by creating new limits on
liability."96 Nevertheless, if enacted, the Oil Pollution Act of 198997 would end
courts have examined OCSLA's effect on state oil spill laws. Nevertheless, OCSLA provides that it
"shall not be interpreted to preempt the field of liability or to preclude any State from imposing
additional requirements or liability for any discharge of oil resulting in damages or removal costs
within the jurisdiction of such State." 43 U.S.C. § 1820(c) (1982). OCSLA does, however, prohibit
double recovery for the same damage or cleanup claims, and preempts state laws that require proof
of financial responsibility beyond the requirements of OCSLA. See id. § 1820(a), (b). "Other than
these restrictions, states are virtually unlimited in their right to create additional oil spin liability
without preemption under [OCSLA]." Bederman, High Stakes in the High Arctic: Jurisdiction and
Compensation for Oil Pollution from Offshore Operations in the Beaufort Sea, 4 ALAsKA L. Rav. 37,
53 (1987).
87. Askew, 411 U.S. at 331.
88. "Whether the amount of costs [Florida] could recover from a wrongdoer is limited to those
specified in the [WQIA] and whether in turn [the WQIA] removes the pre-existing limitations of
liability in the Limited Liability Act are questions we need not reach here." Id. at 332.
89. 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979).
90. Id. at 620-21. The case arose after Steuart's oil barge sank in Chesapeake Bay. Id. at 612.
"At Coast Guard direction, Steuart spent about $40,000 in preliminary containment operations.
Spillage later appeared in areas away from the immediate scene of the accident, and the Coast Guard
directed an extensive removal operation which cost the United States about $480,000 and the Com-
monwealth of Virginia about $41,000." Id.
91. Id. at 620 (construing former VA. CODE § 62.1-44.34.2). Although the Virginia statute
imposed unlimited liability at the time of the oil spill at issue, the statute now limits shipowner
liability to $5,000,000 for oil spills that do not involve negligence. See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-
44.34:2B (1987).
92. Steuart, 596 F.2d at 620 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)(2)).
93. See id. at 620 n.22.
94. See In re Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (applying the LLA to
New York statute imposing strict liability for oil spills); In re Harbor Towing Corp., 335 F. Supp.
1150 (D. Md. 1971) (subjecting Maryland's oil spill liability statute to the LLA).
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1982).
96. Note, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Does Not Preempt State Statutes Imposing Un-
limited Strict Liability: Steuart Transportation Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 9 BALTIMORE L. REv.
1990] 1223
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the preemption debate by expressly precluding application of the LLA, or any
other federal liability statute, to state oil spill statutes.98
In the landmark case of Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Im-
provement Commission,99 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recognized the
ability of states to establish comprehensive oil spill regulatory schemes without
violating the Commerce Clause. 10° The court upheld the Maine Coastal Con-
veyance Act'01 against claims that the Act's levy of a one-half cent per barrel fee
on oil02 and imposition of vicarious liability on terminal facilities1° 3 constituted
an impermissible burden on foreign and interstate commerce. 104 Upholding the
oil tax as part of a valid police power regulation, the court stressed that it was
not a general revenue measure, but a fee designed to offset the risks involved in
over-water oil transport.105 The court also noted that the Maine Act's regula-
tory and liablity scheme did not discriminate against interstate commerce in
favor of intrastate commerce. 10 6
Although the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari for want of a
substantial federal question in Portland Pipe,107 the Maine opinion, like
Askew, 108 remains one of the "key court decisions on the question of state au-
thority in the oil spill area.""109 Read together with Steuart Transportation Co. v.
Allied Towing Corp.,' 10 the two cases leave states virtually free to establish their
own oil spill liability and cleanup regimes without fear of preemption by existing
federal law."' If enacted, the Oil Pollution Act of 1989 will continue to recog-
113, 118 (1979) (citing G. GILMORE & C. BLAcK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 10-4(b) (2d ed.
1975), and 3 E. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 112 (7th ed. 1975)). But see SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY
AND MARITME LAW § 17-1 (1987) ("Authority is sparse, but the Limitation Act... should be
applicable [to state laws] so that limitation can be claimed regarding state cleanup costs.").
97. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
98. See supra text accompanying note 60; see also supra note 55 (citing relevant provisions of
the House and Senate bills).
99. 307 A.2d I (Me. 1973).
100. Id. at 36-40. In relevant part, the Commerce Clause states that "Congress shall have Power
... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states." U.S. CoNsT. art I,
§ 8, cl. 3.
101. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 541-560 (1989 & Supp. 1989) [hereinafter the "Maine
Act"].
102. The tax is used to finance the Maine Coastal and Inland Surface Oil Clean-up Fund. See id.
§ 551.
103. See id. § 552.
104. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Comm'n, 301 A.2d 1, 36-40 (Me.
1973).
105. Id. at 36-39.
106. Id. at 40.
107. 414 U.S. 1035 (1973).
108. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in
Askew).
109. Lipeles, supra note 27, at 444.
110. 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979). See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (discussing the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Steuart).
111. But see infra note 156 (discussing the authority of states to regulate pollution originating
outside their territorial waters). It should be noted, however, that federal law currently preempts
conflicting state regulation of tanker design and operation. In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 163 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that the Ports and Waterways Safety
Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (1972), "intended uniform national standards for design
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nize the power of states to enact special oil spill statutes.1 12
III. STATE OiL SPILL LEGISLATION
With the Supreme Court's authorization in Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc.,' 3 many coastal states have enacted statutes designed to protect
their coastal resources and dependent industries from oil discharges.1 14 Conse-
quently, a myriad of state oil spill statutes is superimposed on the already com-
plex federal statutory scheme. 115 Although the state statutes vary considerably,
all regulate oil pollution in some manner. Some states have "general water pol-
lution control statutes which encompass pollution of waters by oil as well as
other hazardous substances."' I16 Other states employ specialized statutes deal-
ing specifically with oil spill liability and cleanup.117
The most controversial provisions of state oil pollution laws typically in-
volve liability limits, compensation funds, and financial responsibility require-
and construction of tankers that would foreclose the imposition of different or more stringent state
requirements." Accordingly, the Court struck down a Washington law requiring "standard safety
features," including double bottoms, on certain tankers. Id. at 160-68 (construing WASH. REV.
CODE § 88.16.190(2)). The Ray Court also held invalid another provision requiring "enrolled" (en-
gaged in domestic or coastwise trade) oil tankers to take on state-licensed pilots. Id. at 158-59
(construing WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.180). The Court, however, noted that states are free to
impose pilotage requirements on registered vessels entering and leaving their ports. Id. at 159-60.
The Court also recognized that state tug-escort requirements, like local pilotage requirements, were
not the type of regulations demanding a uniform national rule, and did not, therefore, violate the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 179-80.
112. See supra text accompanying note 60; see also supra note 55 (citing provisions of the House
and Senate bills that disclaim intent to preempt state oil spill liability and cleanup statutes).
113. 411 U.S. 325 (1973). For a discussion of the Court's holding in Askew, see supra notes 82-
88 and accompanying text.
114. For examples of the various state statutes, see infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
115. For a detailed, but somewhat dated, analysis of state oil pollution legislation, including
individual summaries of the key provisions in each of the 24 states examined, see Oil Pollution
Liability: Hearing on HR. 1232 Before the Subcomn. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 173-282 (1985) (Report prepared
by the Oceanic Society for the U.S. Coast Guard, entitled, "Oil Spill Liability and Compensation
Legislative Preemption Considerations") [hereinafter "COAST GUARD REPORT"].
116. COAST GUARD REPORT, supra note 115, at 178. See, eg., ALA. CODE §§ 22-22-1 to -22-14
(1984 & Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.011 to 376.17, 376.19 to 376.21 (West 1987); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 17-501 to -522 (1988); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 342D-50 to -60 (Supp. 1989); ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 85, paras. 1701-1706 (Supp. 1987); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2071-2078 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1989); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-17-1 to -17-433 (Supp. 1988); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 691.1 to
691.760.2 (1977 & Supp. 1989); RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-12-1 to -12-433 (1972 & Supp. 1987); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 48-43-5 10 to -43-620 (Law Co-op. 1987); TEX. WATER CODE §§ 26.261 to 26.268
(Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1990).
117. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03, 46.04, and 46.08 (1987); CAL. HARB. & NAy. CODE
§§ 151-152, 293-294 (1978 & Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-448 to -453 (1985 & Supp.
1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6201-6216 (1983 & Supp. 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38,
§§ 541-560 (1989 & Supp. 1989); MD. ENV'T CODE §§ 4-401 to 4-418 (1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 21E, §§ 1-18 (Law Co-op. 1988); N.H. REv. STAT. §§ 146A:1-15, 146D:l-9 (Supp. 1989); N.J.
REv. STAT. §§ 58:10-23.11, 58:10A (1982 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. NAy. LAW §§ 170-197 (1989 &
Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.75 to -215.94, 143-215.94AA- to -215.943J (1987 & Supp.
1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 468.780 to 468.815 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.34:1 to .34:7
(1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 90.48.315 to 90.48.390 (Supp. 1989). Georgia also has special
oil spill provisions which relate only to notification of oil spills. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-14-1 to -
14-4 (1988).
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ments.118 Virtually all states employ an absolute liability or strict liability
standard against oil dischargers. 119 A majority of states impose unlimited liabil-
ity on responsible parties, 120 while others limit liability in varying degrees. 121
Virtually all the states with liability caps, however, follow the FWPCA's ap-
proach and impose full liability when an oil spill involves gross negligence. 122
Many states have special oil spill funds from which the state or other claim-
ants may draw to cover cleanup costs and related damages.1 23 The methods of
funding, however, vary from state to state. Typical financing sources include
legislative appropriations, 124 reimbursements from responsible parties, 125 penal-
ties,126 and licensing fees.127 Some states also levy an excise tax on oil to help
finance their funds. 128 Typically, these surcharges cease once a fund reaches a
certain limit. 129
The Alaska legislature's response to the Exxon Valdez spill illustrates the
importance of funding. In 1986, the legislature established a special fund to
finance Alaska's oil spill cleanup and containment efforts. 130 As originally en-
acted, the Alaska fund had no statutory limit or minimum.1 31 Moreover, the
fund relied on legislative appropriations, and reimbursements, fines, or penalties
118. For a helpful, but slightly dated, table comparing key provisions of state oil spill schemes,
see COAST GUARD REPORT, supra note 115, at 233.
119. COAST GUARD REPORT, supra note 115, at 180. The sole exception is Alabama, which
uses a tort standard of liability. Id. at 181.
120. Id. at 182.
121. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6208(b) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376,12(1) (West
1987); N.J. REv. STAT. § 58:10-23.11(g)(b) (1982); N.Y. NAy. LAW § 181(3) (1989); VA. CODE
ANN. § 62.1-44.34:2B (1987).
122. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6208(b) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12(1) (West
1987); N.J. REV. STAT. § 58:10-23.11(g)(b) (1982); N.Y. NAV. LAW § 181(3) (1989). The sole ex-
ceptior is Virginia, which imposes unlimited liability when the claimant proves negligence alone.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:2B (1987).,
123. See COAST GUARD REPORT, supra note 115, at 191.
124. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.87 (Supp. 1989); TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 26.265(b) (Vernon 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:7 (1987).
125. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.11(2) (West 1987); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-
1411(2) (1987); N.H. REv. STAT. § 146-A:1 1-a (Supp. 1989); N.Y. NAy. LAW § 179(a) (1989); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-215.87 (Supp. 1989); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.265(b) (Vernon 1988); VA.
CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:7 (1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.48.390 (Supp. 1989).
126. "With the exception of Connecticut and New Hampshire, all state statutes explicitly refer
to penalties and fines collected thereunder as a basis for financing their funds." COAST GUARD
REPORT, supra note 115, at 192.
127. "Except for Connecticut, New Jersey, Texas, and Virginia, all states finance their oil spill
funds through collection of license fees." Id.
128. See, eg., Act of July 1, 1989, ch. 112, § 2, 1989 Alaska Sess. Laws 473 (to be codified at
ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.55.200 to 43.55.290); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.11(2) (West 1987); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 551(4)(A) (Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. § 146D:3 (Supp. 1989); N.Y. NAV.
LAW § 174 (1989). "The most common approach is to levy a per-barrel fee on oil passing into or out
of the state through a terminal facility, such as a port, pipeline, or refinery." Lipeles, supra note 27,
at 441.
129. See, eg., Act of July 1, 1989, ch. 112, § 2, 1989 Alaska Sss. Laws 474 (to be codified at
ALASKA STAT. § 43.55.230(c)) ($50,000,000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.11(3)(b) (Vest 1987)
($30,000,000); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 551 (Supp. 1989) ($6,000,000); N.H. REV. STAT.
§ 146D:3 (Supp. 1989) ($10,000,000); N.Y. NAv. LAW § 174(4)(a) (1989) ($25,000,000).
130. See Act of June 1, 1986, ch. 59, § 1, 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws - (codified at ALASKA STAT.
§§ 46.08.005 to 46.08.900 (1987)).
131. Id.
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recovered from responsible parties for its financing. 132 After the Exxon Valdez
disaster, however, the Alaska legislature recognized the inadequacy of the ex-
isting fund, and the need for a readily available source of financing for future
containment and cleanup efforts.' 33 Accordingly, the legislature established a
five cents per barrel surcharge on oil produced in the state to maintain the oil
spill fund at fifty million dollars.1 34
Although several states allow only state agencies to receive disbursements
from their oil spill funds, at least three states specifically authorize third party
claims against their funds. 135 In Maine, for example, a party injured as a result
of an oil spill files a claim with the Board of Environmental Protection against
the state's oil spill fund. 136 If the Board, the claimant, and the oil spiller agree
on the amount of damages, the Board certifies the claim to the State Treasurer,
who pays the claim directly from the oil spill fund. 137 If, however, the parties
cannot agree, the Board of Environmental Protection must submit the claim to
the Board of Arbitration to determine the amount of damages.138 After the
132. See id. (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 46.08.020 (1987)).
133. Specifically, the legislature found "that the March 24, 1989, oil spill disaster in Prince Wil-
liam Sound demonstrate[d] a need for the state to have an independent spill containment and
cleanup capability in the event of future discharges of oil or a hazardous substance." Act of July 1,
1989, ch. 112, § 1(a), 1989 Alaska Sess. Laws 473.
134. Id. § 2 (to be codified at ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.55.200 to 43.55.290). Cf. supra notes 61-62
and accompanying text (discussing federal bills that would establish a $1 billion Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund financed by a per-barrel tax on domestic and imported oil). In addition to the per-barrel
tax, the Alaskan legislature expanded the purposes of the fund to include maintenance of a new oil
and hazardous substance response office and corps. See Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 113, § 2, 1989
Alaska Sess. Laws 478 (to be codified at ALASKA STAT. § 46.08.100 and .08.110). The legislature
established new detailed guidelines for increased state oil spill contingency planning. Act of June 3,
1989, ch. 90, § 1, 1989 Alaska Sess. Laws 353 (to be codified at ALASKA STAT. § 46.04.200). The
legislature also established a new commission of state residents and national experts to study the
Exxon Valdez disaster and to recommend "changes needed to minimize the possibility and effects of
similar oil spills." Act of May 1, 1989, ch. 42, § 1, 1989 Alaska Sess. Laws 121.
135. COAsT GUARD REPORT, supra note 115, at 194. The three states allowing private claims
are Maine, New Jersey, and New York. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 551(2) (1989); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 58:10-23.11(g) (1982); N.Y. NAy. LAW § 182 (1989). Similarly, if enacted, the Oil
Pollution Act of 1989 would authorize private claims against a new one billion dollar trust fund in
certain circumstances. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed com-
pensation system).
136. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 551(2) (1989). A claim must specifically allege damages to
real estate or personal property or loss of income resulting from an oil discharge, and must be filed
within six months of the spill. Id. Claimants waive any right to pursue damages "omitted from any
claim at the time the award is made." Id. § 551(2)(C).
137. Id. § 551(2)(A). The fund is financed primarily by license fees on certain facilities, but also
includes reimbursements from polluters. Id. § 551(4), (6) (1989 & Supp. 1989). The fund is limited
to a total balance of $6,000,000. Id. § 551 (Supp. 1989). Although this statutory limit implicitly sets
a liablity limit at $6,000,000, the Act grants emergency powers to the governor that may entitle the
state to additional state and federal funds. See Note, supra note 71, at 799 n.87 (citing ME. Rv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 547).
138. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 551(2)(B) (1989). "The Board of Arbitration shall consist
of 3 persons, one to be chosen by the person determined ... by the board [of Environmental Protec-
tion] to have caused the discharge, one to be chosen by the board to represent the public interest and
one person chosen by the first 2 appointed members to serve as a neutral arbitrator." Id. § 551(3). If
a neutral arbitrator cannot be agreed upon within 10 days, "the board shall request the American
Arbitration Association to utilize its procedures for the selection of the neutral arbitrator." Id.
Determinations of the Board of Arbitration are subject to judicial review, "but only as to mat-
ters relating to abuse of discretion by the Board of Arbitration." Id. § 551(3)(E). If an arbitration
award is appealed, payment of damages is witheld until final judgment. Id. § 551(3)(G). In Brown
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claimant is paid from the fund, the state seeks reimbursement from the responsi-
ble party.13 9 By providing an available source of compensation for property
losses and a relatively simple method of recovery, the Maine oil spill fund "elim-
inates the need for [injured] parties to file tort claims to recover damages." 14
Some states also have recognized the necessity of financial responsibility
requirements to ensure that oil dischargers will have sufficient funds to cover
cleanup costs and damages. 14 1 "The kinds of proof necessary to demonstrate
financial responsibility vary from state to state." 142 Maryland and Massachu-
setts, for example, require posting of bonds, but "Maryland waives the bond
requirement if financial responsibility has been demonstrated under Federal
law." 143 Other states "accept a wider variety of proof... including insurance,
surety bonds, qualifications of self insurance and other proof acceptable to the
responsible state authority." 144 Dollar amounts required to be proven range
"from a low of $25,000 for vessels in Massachusetts to as much as $50 million
for terminal facilities in Alaska." 145 Some states enforce their financial responsi-
bility requirements with fines for noncompliance. 146
IV. NORTH CAROLINA'S OIL SPILL LEGISLATION
The North Carolina General Assembly made its first foray into oil spill
regulation with the North Carolina Oil and Hazardous Substances Control Act
of 1978 (the "1978 Act"). 147 Under the 1978 Act, "any person" 148 found re-
v. Department of Environmental Protection, 495 A.2d 1138 (Me. 1988), the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine held that responsible parties have standing to appeal arbitration awards under the Maine
oil spill statute. In Brown, the court reversed a contrary holding by a lower court despite the lower
court's finding "that an appeal from the arbitration proceedings would be inconsistent with the stat-
utory objective of prompt payment for third party claims." Id. at 1140 n.5.
139. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 551(6) (1989). Under a strict liability provision, the
state need not plead negligence to recover damages, but need only present evidence of the identity of
the oil spiller. See id. § 552(2). The state may also recover its cleanup costs. Id.
140. Note, supra note 71, at 799. "The statute, in effect, transfers from private claimants to the
state the right to bring actions against polluters." Id. at 799 n.89. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine upheld the arbitration provisions of the Maine Act against a procedural due process challenge
in Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Comm'n, 307 Me. 1, 14-16 (1973),
appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973).
141. Some states require proof of financial responsibility from both vessels and facilities. See,
e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 46.04.040 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6209 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 376.14 (West 1987). Other states require proof from vessels only. See MD. ENV'T CODE § 4-407
(1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21, § 50B (Law Co-op. 1988). At one time, Connecticut also re-
quired proof of financial responsibility from vessels, but abolished the requirement in 1987. See Act
Repealing Vessel Bonding Requirements, ch. 125, § 2, 1987 Conn. Acts 159, 163 (Reg. Sess.) (re-
pealing CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-455). The FWPCA also requires proof of financial responsibility
from certain vessels. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(p) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
142. COAn GuARD REPORT, supra note 115, at 189.
143. Id. See MD. ENV'T CODE § 4-407 (1987); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21, § 50B (Law Co-op.
1988).
144. COAST GUARD REPORT, supra note 115, at 189-90.
145. Id. at 190. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.04.040 (1987); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21, § 50 (Law
Co-op. 1988).
146. CoAST GUARD REPORT, supra note 115, at 190. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6209(d)
(1983) ("not less than $5,000 nor more than $15,000"); MD. ENV'T CODE § 4-407 (1987) ("not
exceeding $5,000 for each offense"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21, § 50B (Law. Co-op. 1988) ($5,000).
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.75 to -215.94 (1987 & Supp. 1989). The Act originally was
enacted in 1973 as the Oil Pollution Control Act of 1973, ch. 534, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 816. In
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sponsible for an oil spill in North Carolina waters is strictly liable "for damages
to persons or property, public or private." 14 9 The 1978 Act authorizes the State
to recover damages including costs of investigating violations of the Act and
costs of replenishing natural resources. 150 Liability to the State under the 1978
Act, however, is subject to federal limitations.' 5' The 1978 Act also authorizes
civil penalties for intentional or negligent discharges of oil, and criminal sanc-
tions for intentional or knowing discharges. 152 To secure liability for cleanup
costs and penalties, the 1978 Act also imposes liens on vessels responsible for oil
spills.' 5 3 Like similar legislation in other states,154 the 1978 Act establishes a
special fund, financed primarily through legislative appropriations, to pay for
state cleanup and recovery efforts. 155
With resource protection as its primary goal, 156 the new Offshore Oil Spill
Act slightly modified the 1978 Act,157 and added a new comprehensive section
designed to minimize the adverse environmental impact of oil and gas activities
off the North Carolina coast. 158 The new legislation extends coverage of the
1978 Act to oil spills outside the territorial jurisdiction of the State that affect
1978, the General Assembly amended the Act to include hazardous substances, and renamed it the
Oil Pollution and Hazardous Substances Act of 1978, ch. 535, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 551.
148. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.77(13) (1987) (defining "Person" for purposes of the Act).
149. Id. § 143-215.93. Liability under the 1978 Act is joint and several. Id. § 143-215.94. Like
the federal statutes, the North Carolina statute provides the traditional defenses to liability, includ-
ing acts of God, acts of war, and negligence of a third party. See id. § 143-215.83(b).
150. See id. § 143-215.90(a).
151. See id. § 143-215.89.
152. See id. § 143-215.91. Civil penalties must not exceed $5000. Id. § 143-215.91(a). The
North Carolina Environmental Management Commission determines the exact amount of civil pen-
alties after considering certain specified factors. Id. With regard to criminal penalties the Act
provides:
Any person who intentionally or knowingly or willfully discharges or causes or permits the
discharge of oil... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not to
exceed six months or by fine to be not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by
both, in the discretion of the court.
Id. § 143-215.91(b).
153. See id. § 143-215.92. "[S]aid lien shall not attach if a surety bond is posted ... or a cash
deposit is made with the [North Carolina Environmental Management] Commission in an amount
acceptable to the Commission. Provided further, that such lien shall not have priority over any
existing perfected lien or security interest." Id.
154. See supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text (discussing oil spin funds in other states).
155. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.87 (Supp. 1989) (establishing an "Oil or Other Hazardous
Substances Pollution Protection Fund"). The fund also includes "fees, charges, penalties or other
moneys" recovered from responsible parties. Id. "The moneys shall be used to defray the expenses
of any project or program for the containment, collection, dispersal or removal of oil... discharged
to the land or waters of this State... or for restoration necessitated by the discharge." Id.
156. Although there is no documented legislative history of the new Act, Mr. Tim Nifong of the
Ocean Unit of the North Carolina Attorney General's Office, who helped draft the bill for Represen-
tative Basnight, stated in a telephone conversation that the new legislation was designed primarily to
protect North Carolina coastal resources. Telephone interview with Tim Nifong, Ocean Unit, North
Carolina Attorney General's Office (Jan. 23, 1990). Mr. Nifong also noted that the drafters drew
from legislation in other states, but did not model it after any particular state. Id. See also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-215.94AA(2) (Supp. 1989) (legislative finding that preservation of the traditional
uses of the seacoast "is a matter of the highest urgency and priority").
157. See Act of July 19, 1989, ch. 656, §§ 1-4, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 222-26.
158. See id. § 5 (adding new Part to Article 21A of Chapter 143 entitled "Offshore Oil and Gas
Activities: Adverse Environmental Impact Protection") (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-
215.94AA to -215.94JJ (Supp. 1989)).
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North Carolina waters.15 9 More importantly, however, the new legislation cre-
ates a system for recovery of both public and private oil spill cleanup costs and
damages in state court, 16° and attempts to organize the State's oil spill response
efforts. 161
In what may be the most significant provision of the new Offshore Oil Spill
Act, Section 143-215.94FF(b) allows injured private parties to file civil actions
for damages1 62 against responsible persons16 3 in North Carolina state courts.164
This improves upon the 1978 Act which made responsible parties liable for both
public and private damages, but provided no means of asserting such claims. 165
In, addition, the new Act expands the definition of damages to include injury to
real or personal property,1 66 business loss,1 67 interest on loans obtained to ame-
159. The new Act expands the definition of "discharge" to include spills into "waters of the State
or into waters outside the territorial limits of the State which affect lands, waters ot uses related
thereto within the territorial limits of the State." Id. § 1 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
215.77(4)).
Although the ability of states to regulate oil pollution originating in their own waters was up-
held in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973), "[t]here remains some
question as to whether states can impose liability on activities located beyond their territorial limits
that cause oil pollution within their jurisdiction." Lipeles, supra note 27, at 435-36 (citation omit-
ted). "A recent United States Supreme Court decision confirms the tenuousness of a state's imposi-
tion of liabilities in conflict with the FWPCA for damage caused by discharge outside of state
waters." Bederman, supra note 86, at 51. In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481
(1987), Vermont residents filed a common-law nuisance action under Vermont law against a New
York paper mill that had discharged pollutants into Lake Champlain, which forms part of the bor-
der between Vermont and New York. Upholding summary judgment for the mill, the United States
Supreme Court held that the FWPCA preempts the common law of an affected state to the extent it
attempts to impose liability on a point source in another state. Id. at 497. Specifically, the Court
found that application of Vermont law against the New York mill "would allow respondents to
circumvent the NPDES permit system, thereby upsetting the balance of public and private interests
so carefully addressed by the [FWPCA]." Id. at 494. Although the effect of Ouellette on state oil
spill liability laws remains unclear, one might argue that "since the FWPCA itself does not afford a
private right to compensation, a state scheme which does would not necessarily be incompatible with
the FWPCA's purpose." Bederman, supra note 86, at 52. Nevertheless, as one commentator warns,
"where the discharge does not occur within [a state's] territorial waters, state law could be pre-
empted by the FWPCA." Id.
160. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text (discussing recoverable damages under the
Act).
163. "Responsible person" means any of the following:
a. The owner or transporter of natural gas, oil or drilling waste which causes an injury
covered by this Part.
b. The owner, operator, lessee of, or person who charters by demise, any offshore well,
undersea site, facility, oil rig, oil platform, vessel, or pipeline which is the source of natural
gas, oil, drilling waste, or is the source or location of exploration which causes an injury
covered by this Part. "Responsible party" does not include the United States, the State,
any county, municipality or public governmental agency; however, this exception ... shall
not be read to exempt utilities from the provisions of this Part.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.94BB(6) (Supp. 1989).
164. Such actions "shall be brought in the superior court of the county in which the alleged
injury occurred or in which the alleged damaged property is located." Id. § 143-215.94FF(b). The
new Act also authorizes the Attorney General to bring class actions for damages and injuntive relief
in the Wake County Superior Court. Id. § 143-215.94FF(a).
165. See id. § 143-215.93.
166. Injury or harm to property
includes the cost of restoring, repairing, or replacing any real or personal property dam-
aged or destroyed by a discharge .... any income lost from the time such property is
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liorate oil spill effects, cleanup costs, and costs of restoring natural resources. 6 8
Moreover, Section 143-215.94CC(a) makes responsible persons strictly liable for
all cleanup costs and damages, notwithstanding the limitations established by
the 1978 Act.1 69
In addition to providing a statutory scheme for oil spill liability and com-
pensation, the new Offshore Oil Spill Act also increases the State's role in plan-
ning for and responding to oil spills. Section 143-215.94HH requires the State
Emergency Response Commission to promulgate a State oil spill contingency
plan,170 and directs the Secretary of Crime Control and Public Safety to estab-
lish an emergency oil spill control network to provide immediate access to avail-
able equipment.171 The new legislation also requires any person responsible for
an oil spill to notify the State immediately, 172 and authorizes the Department of
Environmental Health and Natural Resources to respond with cleanup ef-
forts.17 3 Section 143-215.94II(a) directs the Governor to declare a state of emer-
gency "[w]henever any emergency exists or appears imminent," arising out of an
oil spill.
17 4
V. RooM FOR IMPROVEMENT
Although offshore drilling is still in the planning stages in North Caro-
damaged to the time such property is restored, repaired, or replaced, and any reduction in
value of such property caused by such discharge by comparison with its value prior
thereto.
Id. § 143-215.94BB(1)(a).
167. "Business loss" includes "loss of income or impairment of earning capacity due to damage
to real or personal property or to damage or destruction of natural resources upon which such
income or earning capacity is reasonably dependent." Id. § 143-215.94BB(l)(b).
168. Id. § 143-215.94BB(l)(c)-(e). The new Act also allows the State to recover additional dam-
ages for injury to natural resources. Id. § 143-215.94BB(l)(f)(1). Liability under the new legisla-
tion, however, does not include damages for personal injury. Id. § 143-215.94DD(c).
169. Id. § 143-215.94CC(a). As under the 1978 Act, liability under the new legislation is joint
and several. See id. § 143-215.94DD(a). Responsible persons may avoid liability to injured parties
by proving that damages were caused solely by an act of war, act of God, negligence of the injured
party or of a third party, and other limited situations. See id. § 143-215.94CC(b).
170. See id. § 143-215.94HH(a). For the text of § 143-215.94HH(a), see infra note 179. As of
February 1990, the North Carolina contingency plan was still in the planning stages. According to a
newsletter published by the North Carolina Outer Continental Shelf Office, "[u]nder the direction of
Joe Myers, emergency management director, a planning group has been formed and initial meetings
held to identify state and federal agency responsibilities for spill response." Outer Continental Shelf
Office, N.C. Dep't of Admin., State Working on Oil Spill Plan, 2 OCS UPDATE (Feb. 1990).
171. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.94HH(b) (Supp. 1989). "Such network shall be employed
to provide an immediate response to an oil discharge into the offshore marine environment which is
reasonably likely to affect the State's coastal waters." Id.
172. See id. § 143-215.94GG(a). Notification must be made "pursuant to rules established by
the Secretary of Crime Control and Public Safety ... but in no case later than two hours after the
discharge." Id. Failure to immediately report a discharge subjects the violator to civil penalties up
to $250,000, depending on the quantity of oil spilled. Id. § 143-215.94GG(b).
173. See id. § 143-215.94EE(a). The 1978 Act requires responsible persons to "immediately un-
dertake to collect and remove" spilled oil. Id. § 143-215.84(a).
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.9411(a) (Supp. 1989). The new legislation also contains a sav-
ings clause expressly disclaiming any intent to "conflict with limitations on State authority estab-
lished by federal law." Id. § 143-215.94JJ; see supra notes 80-112 and accompanying text (discussing
potential preemptive effect of federal law).
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lina,175 as Donna Moffitt, director of the North Carolina Outer Continental
Shelf Office, once warned: "a tanker spill can happen even without offshore de-
velopment." 17 6 Oil tankers traveling the North Carolina coast and unloading at
the State's ports already pose a threat to coastal resources. 17 7 The risk of oil
spills will increase if indeed oil is found off the North Carolina coast. The new
Offshore Oil Spill Act represents an effort to cope with the inevitable effects of
oil pollution;178 but the resulting legislation incorporates many of the pitfalls of
similar state and federal statutes.
The North Carolina law, for example, does little to ensure that the State
will respond effectively to oil spills. Although the new legislation requires the
State to prepare an oil spill contingency plan, the General Assembly gave no
guidelines as to what the plan is to cover or how it is to be implemented. 179
Similarly, the new law provides for an emergency oil spill network comprised of
available equipment from state and local governments. 180 The General Assem-
bly, however, provided no readily available source of funding for additional
cleanup capability should the available equipment prove inadequate.181 Because
the nearest Coast Guard oil spill response team currently is stationed in Ala-
175. See supra note 9 (discussing Mobil Oil Corp.'s plans to drill off the North Carolina coast),
176. State Unprepared, supra note 11, at l-C, col. 1. "Most offshore spills are the result of
tanker and barge accidents, but pipeline and platform accidents (i.e. well blowouts, explosions, and
fires) occasionally contribute to the total." U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, supra note 1, at 15. In fact,
based on 1985 estimates, less than two percent of oil pollution in the marine environment results
from oil and gas production. Id.
177. "During the past five years, about 500 tankers carrying about 180,000 tons of petroleum
products docked at Wilmington and Morehead City." State Unprepared, supra note 11, at 1-C, col.
1 (citing Coast Guard records). "During that time, the Coast Guard reported five spills, most of
them a few gallons." Id.
Although North Carolina has not experienced a major oil spill, the State's good fortune does
not belie the need for an ability to respond to even relatively small spills. A 1969 spill of approxi-
mately 4,100 gallons of No. 2 fuel oil off West Falmouth, Massachusetts illustrates the destructive
potential of small spills. According to a recent U.S. Department of Interior report:
Even though this spill was relatively small .... the prevailing south to southwesterly winds
in this region created an oil-in-water emulsion which spread over more than 1,000 acres of
Wild Harbor River, causing immediate large-scale mortality of marine animals in the inter-
tidal and subtidal zones of the river. This is an example of the unpredictability of the
potential impact of a spill.
U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, supra note 1, at 15 (citing H. Sanders, J. Grassle, G. Hampton, L. Morse,
S. Garner-Price, and C. Jones, Anatomy of an Oil Spill: Long Term Effects from the Barge Florida
Off West Falmouth, Massachusetts, 38 J. MARINE REs. 265-380 (1980)).
178. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.94AA (Supp. 1989) (declaration of public policy accompa-
nying North Carolina's new oil spill legislation).
179. In relevant part, § 143-215.94HH(a) provides:
The State Emergency Response Commission ... shall develop a State oil spill contingency
plan relating soley to the undersea exploration, extraction, production and transport of oil
... in the marine environment off the North Carolina coast, including any such develop-
ment on the Outer Continental Shelf seaward of the State's jurisdiction over its territorial
waters.
Id. § 143-215.94HH(a).
180. See id. § 143-215.94HH(b).
181. The legislation merely provides that the "oil spill contingency plan and oil spill response
network ... shall be reviewed and evaluated for adequacy and continued feasibility every three
years, or more often if deemed appropriate by the Secretary of Crime Control and Public Safety."
Id. § 143-215.94HH(b)(4).
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bama,182 the importance of locally available manpower and cleanup equipment
must not be overlooked. 183
Moreover, if the Alaskan experience is any indication, 184 the North Caro-
lina Oil Pollution Protection Fund's reliance on legislative appropriations will
leave it inadequately financed in the event of a major oil spill.185 As one com-
mentator observed, "[t]his method somewhat hampers the damage compensa-
tion objective as compared to automatic funding because the appropriations
process does not always provide monies at the necessary time or in the necessary
amount."'186 In addition to, or instead of, legislative appropriations, a per-barrel
fee on oil would provide a reliable source of funds.'8 7 A per-barrel fee could
also provide an incentive for industry prevention, as consumers "might exert
some pressure on producers to keep prices down by preventing spills.' i88
Other omissions in the North Carolina law further reduce the incentive for
industry efforts to prevent oil spills. Although imposition of strict unlimited
liability on oil spillers will theoretically force them to internalize the costs of oil
pollution, economists have demonstrated that the threat of liability alone will
182. See State Unprepared, supra note 11, at 1-C, col. 1.
183. For example, "the cleanup of a spill of 500,000-plus gallons of fuel oil into the Savannah
River at Savannah, Ga., in December 1986 was delayed because it took the Coast Guard four days to
find the source." Id. As one environmentalist warned, "[t]he situation that existed in Savannah
exists now in North Carolina." Id. (quoting Hans Neuhauser, Coastal Resources Director for the
Georgia Conservancy).
184. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Alaskan legislature's post-
Exxon Valdez enactment of a per-barrel tax on oil to help finance the state's $50,000,000 cleanup
fund).
185. Indeed, the fund currently may be underfunded. In a 1985 report comparing state oil spill
funds, the Coast Guard indicated that the North Carolina fund was "not well endowed." CoAsT
GUARD REPORT, supra note 115, at 271.
186. Lipeles, supra note 27, at 442. North Carolina's reliance on legislative appropriations may
be particularly ineffective, given the State's current budgetary crisis. See generally Riley, State
Budget Outlook Grows Gloomier, The News and Observer (Raliegh, N.C.), June 5, 1990, at 1B, col. 2
(discussing North Carolina's $550 million revenue shortage for budget year ending June 30, 1990).
187. For example, funding for Florida's "oil spill program has been derived from the past collec-
tion of a $0.02 per barrel excise tax on pollutants transferred across State waters at their initial point
of transfer." Oil Pollution Liability: Hearing on H.R. 1632 Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard &
Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1987)
(statement of Bob Martinez, Governor of the State of Florida). According to Governor Bob Marti-
nez, the Florida fund "reached its statutory cap of $35 million in 1980; since that time, the cap has
been lowered to $25 million, and there has not been a need to reactivate the collection of the excise
tax." Id. Governor Martinez added that, since its enactment in 1970, the Florida system "has
provided Florida with the capacity for well-coordinated responses to over 300 spills that are annu-
ally investigated by the State of Florida." Id. The Florida oil spill program is codified at FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 376.011 to 376.17, 376.19 to 376.21 (1987).
188. Lipeles, supra note 27, at 442. As one commentator noted:
[The per-barrel fee] seems equitable in that it relates the costs a facility must bear to the
amount of oil it might spill. However, it tends to relax the prevention incentive in two
ways. First, it places no burden on vessels, the largest category of polluters.... Second,
the per-barrel fee does not distinguish between facilities with good and poor spill records.
Id. at 441. To alleviate the second disincentive, Ms. Lipeles suggests a system requiring "terminal
facilities and vessels to pay annual risk charges, based on oil handling capacity, cleanup capability,
previous 'risk experience,' and, in the case of vessels, the presence or absence of specified design
characteristics." Id. (citing ALAsKA STAT. § 30.25.250(a) (Supp. 1976)). Although Alaska at one
time required risk charges from facilities and vessels, the Alaskan legislature repealed the risk charge
provision in 1980. Act of July 1, 1980, ch. 116, § 11, 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws 15 (repealing ALAsKA
STAT. § 30.25).
1990] 1233
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
not prevent oil spills.' 8 9 Without some sort of financial responsibility require-
ment' ° or risk charge system, 19 even North Carolina's imposition of unlimited
liability will not appreciably increase "the burdens on industry beyond federal
requirements" 19 2 until a spill actually occurs.
Although the Offshore Oil Spill Act establishes a liability and compensation
regime that will help facilitate recovery of oil spill cleanup costs and damages, 193
the Act's reliance on litigation may prove burdensome to private claimants seek-
ing recovery of property and income losses. Under the current legislation, state
courts in coastal counties would be inundated with private damage claims in the
event of a major oil spill. 194 Although the strict liability standard 195 might help
claimants obtain prompt recovery of oil spill damages, the nature of litigation
provides responsible parties with ample opportunity to delay damage awards. In
contrast, an administrative compensation system, similar to the one employed
by Maine, 196 would offer expedited recovery to private claimants who would
"need only present a claim to the state board along with proof of damage to
obtain immediate financial compensation for .. . oil pollution damage." 197
Before such a system could be implemented, however, the General Assembly
would have to identify a reliable source of funding, such as license fees or an
excise tax on oil.' 9 8
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the current North Carolina oil pollution law may prove to have
189. See generally, Hartje, Oil Pollution Caused by Tanker Accidents: Liability Versus Regula-
tion, 24 NAT. REs. J. 41, 60 (1984) (economic analysis concluding that "[c]hanges in liability law
have improved the legal positions of the victims, but remain insufficient as an incentive for accident
prevention"); Bradley, Marine Oil Spills: A Problem in Environmental Management, 14 NAT. RFiS,
J. 337-59 (1974) (economic approach proposing a fine system to address detection and enforcement
problems for oil spillage control).
190. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text (discussing state financial responsibility re-
quirements). The North Carolina legislation currently requires no proof of financial responsibility
from either vessels or facilities.
191. See supra note 188 (discussing risk charges).
192. Lipeles, supra note 27, at 441. "The only time an unlimited liability provision met strong
resistance was when Florida refused to honor the federal certificate [showing financial responsibil-
ity]; the state later revised its law to limit shippers' liability and to accept the FWPCA certificate."
Id. at 440-41. Cf. supra note 141 (noting Connecticut's 1987 repeal of vessel bonding requirements).
193. See Act of July 19, 1989, ch. 656, § 5, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 222 (codified at N.C, GEN.
STAT. §§ 143-215.94AA to -215.94JJ (Supp. 1989)).
194. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.94FF(b) (Supp. 1989) (requiring private damage claims to
be "brought in the superior court of the county in which the alleged injury occurred or in which the
alleged damaged property is located, or in the county in which the injured party resided"), See also
supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting rush of lawsuits following the Exxon Valdez disaster).
195. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.94CC(a) (Supp. 1989) (imposing strict liability on responsi-
ble persons).
196. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text (discussing Maine's oil spill compensation
scheme).
197. Note, supra note 71, at 817. But see supra note 138 (discussing standing for appeal of
arbitration awards under the Maine oil spill compensation scheme).
198. See Bederman, supra note 86, at 64 (noting that use of Alaska's oil spill fund to compensate
private claimants "would require expansion of financing ... and specific procedural provisions au-
thorizing successful private claimants to draw upon it up to a specified limit").
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little effect on efforts to prevent oil spills, 199 the new legislation provides a liabil-
ity and compensation scheme that should help deal with oil spills when they do
occur.2° ° Moreover, although North Carolina law provides little guidance in
planning for oil spill response, 20 1 it does provide a basic framework within
which State officials can work to organize their cleanup efforts.20 2 In light of the
deficiencies and advantages of the new oil spill legislation, the North Carolina
General Assembly apparently has learned some, but not all, of the lessons taught
by the Exxon Valdez spill.20 3 Only time will tell, however, whether the new law
will meet its lofty goal of protecting North Carolina's coastal resources from the
potentially devastating effects of oil spills.
GARY V. PERKO
199. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 1-8, and accompanying text (discussing the Exxon Valdez spill); supra notes
130-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Alaska legislature's response to the spill).
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